the ways in which this understanding of Kantian constructivism fits within the broader comparative project in ‘moral theory’ that. Rawls inherits from Sidgwick. The author outlines the chief features of the constructivist moral conception in its Kantian KANTIAN CONSTRUCTIVISM IN MORAL THEORY. John Rawls. The papers by Rawls most relevant here are: “Kantian Constructivism in Moral. Theory: The Dewey Lectures ,” Journal of Philosophy 77 ():
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Sections 2—4 examine the main varieties of metaethical constructivism.
KANTIAN CONSTRUCTIVISM IN MORAL THEORY
Humean constructivism has established itself as a prominent variety of metaethics, which avoids any commitment to moral realism. While the procedure specifies a function of practical rationality, it does not commit to any specific view about autonomy.
How to cite this entry. While also preoccupied with explaining normativity, other constructivists view the semantic task as worthwhile Street ; Richardson But they all find that the notion of construction is a distinctive explanatory device for capturing the objectivity and normativity of ethical truths. Peers Versus National Culture: As Rawls explains it, The difficulty is that Kant appears to know in advance of critical reflection how a constructivist doctrine might look, but this makes it impossible to undertake such reflection in good faith.
Relatedly, they deny that claims about the autonomy of reason or its practical function commit one to constructivism. The constitutivist strategy morwl to be particularly problematic for the varieties of Kantian constructivism that derive ni obligations from structural features of rational agency. Sections 6 and 7 review clnstructivism debates about the problems, promise and prospects of metaethical constructivism.
A thing that does not serve this purpose is on a house. Constitutivism is the view that one can explain reasons or normativity in terms of what is constitutive of agency.
According to Scanlon, in order for there to be truths about reasons, it is not necessary for these normative facts to have a kind of metaphysical reality that good normative reasoning might not guarantee.
They seek to provide objectivist accounts of the basic principles of morality, rather than of all normative principles. Perspectives on Contemporary Hegel: The purpose of theorizing in ethics is partly interpretative and partly normative. How to make something of yourself without being all that you can be. The philosophical issue worth thinking about is normativity, and this is not something that we can explain solely via semantics.
As a result, practical reasoning justifies the prohibition to harm, coerce, and deceive others. Arguably, the principle of logical consistency is one such principle but it is generally thought to be too thin to help in rational choice.
It is by conforming to these principles, Korsgaard argues, that one makes oneself into an agent. Constructivists must deny the correspondence theory of truth, the view that truth is correspondence to a fact.
Constructivism in Metaethics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
How does awareness of this fact rationally compel us to refrain from deceiving? For some this means that constructivism does not qualify as a metaethical theory: It thus takes morality to be a cooperative enterprise, and implies that the need for objective moral standards is practical.
Related Entries anti-realism cognitivism vs. She departs from the versions of Kantian constructivism discussed above because she makes no appeal to transcendental arguments and rejects the idealized conceptions of rational agency that are at play in other versions of Kantian constructivism.
Reason is autonomous if its authority rests on its proper activity, rather than being derived from elements of the world outside of reason. Practical reasoning does not serve the purpose of discovering an order of values independent of its verdicts. The difficulty is that Kant appears to know in advance of critical reflection how a constructivist doctrine might conatructivism, but this makes it impossible to undertake such reflection in good faith.
In section 6 we will consider how this form of constructivism relates to anti-realism and expressivism. This test of rejectability specifies the content of raqls principles, and tells us why it is rational for us to adopt them. Varieties of Kantian Constructivism 2. Like the Kantian varieties of constructivism, Aristotelian constructivism appeals to constitutive features of practical reason: Self-Legislation and Radical Kantian Morql.
In other words, realists take the normativity of reasons as a primitive feature that does not require any explanation constructivismm for consttuctivism no further explanation will be useful.
His incoherence can be shown by spelling out the norms that are constitutive of valuing. But if the norm is constitutive of reasoning, theor can she break the norm by reasoning? Aristotelian constructivism works out a story about the norms for success in judgment, which is considered a problem iin Kant and an unrecognized lacuna constructiism contemporary Kantian ethics Millgram Some Kantians think that fictional Caligula is incoherent, even though not obviously so.
The Mafioso thus fails as a rational agent and leads a life that is not autonomous, because his life is not the product of reflective self-government.
This is because realism simply ,oral the existence of objective standards for morality without offering a rational basis for them; hence the realist affirms what the skeptic denies. Pragmatism and DeliberationLondon: But there is a disagreement as to whether in kantlan to be a form of realism, a theory must hold a stronger claim that e moral properties are mind-independent.
Korsgaard points to an assumption she believes that realists and antirealists share and that constructivists reject, namely, that the primary function of concepts deployed in judgments that can be true or false is to represent things as they are, so if normative judgments are true, they must represent something real out there in the world. In contrast to Kantian self-legislation, Aristotelian constructivism emphasizes the interplay between rational and animal nature, focusing especially on training and shaping the affective and sensitive aspects of our nature.
As a consequence, reflective agents may find themselves holding incompatible prereflective and reflective judgments. They bear a problematic relation to traditional classifications of metaethical theories.
Constructivism in Metaethics
In his view, the fact of reason indicates that the deliverances of practical reason cohere with our moral experience. She argues that valuing humanity, where humanity is understood as the capacity for rationality, is the condition of the possibility of valuing anything at all Korsgaard a: To this extent, this metaethical view shares the ambitions of Kantian constructivism to ground normative truths in features of rational agency.
The appeal of this view lies in the promise to explain how normative truths are objective and independent of our actual judgments, while also binding and authoritative for us. For the constructivist, there is an interesting continuity between normative discourse and metaethics. Thus, there seems to be a disagreement between constructivists and their critics about what it takes to engage within a metaethical inquiry.
Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPaperswith links to its database. However, many think of construction as a form of hypothetical procedure akin to contract Street